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Preventing Location-Based Identity Inference in
Anonymous Spatial Queries
Panos Kalnis, Gabriel Ghinita, Kyriakos Mouratidis, and Dimitris Papadias
Abstract—The increasing trend of embedding positioning ca-
pabilities (e.g., GPS) in mobile devices facilitates the widespread
use of Location Based Services. For such applications to suc-
ceed, privacy and conﬁdentiality are essential. Existing privacy-
enhancing techniques rely on encryption to safeguard commu-
nication channels, and on pseudonyms to protect user identities.
Nevertheless, the query contents may disclose the physical loca-
tion of the user.
In this paper, we present a framework for preventing location-
based identity inference of users who issue spatial queries to
Location Based Services. We propose transformations based
on the well-established K-anonymity concept to compute exact
answers for range and nearest neighbor search, without revealing
the query source. Our methods optimize the entire process of
anonymizing the requests and processing the transformed spatial
queries. Extensive experimental studies suggest that the proposed
techniques are applicable to real-life scenarios with numerous
mobile users.
Index Terms—Privacy, Anonymity, Location Based Services,
Spatial Databases, Mobile Systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
I
N recent years, positioning devices (e.g., GPS) have
gained tremendous popularity. Navigation systems are already
widespread in the automobile industry and, together with wireless
communications, facilitate exciting new applications. General
Motor’s OnStar system, for example, supports on-line rerouting to
avoid trafﬁc jams and automatically alerts the authorities in case
of an accident. More applications based on the users’ location
are expected to emerge with the arrival of the latest gadgets (e.g.,
iPAQ hw6515, Mio A701), which combine the functionality of a
mobile phone, PDA and GPS receiver. For such applications to
succeed, the privacy and conﬁdentiality issues are of paramount
importance.
Consider that Bob uses his GPS-enabled mobile phone to ﬁnd
the nearest betting ofﬁce. This query can be answered by a
Location Based Service (LBS) in a publicly available web server
(e.g., Google Maps). Since Bob does not want to disclose to
Alice his gambling habits, instead of directly sending the query
to the LBS, he uses an anonymizer, which is a trusted server
(services for anonymous web surﬁng are commonly available
nowadays). He establishes a secure connection (e.g., SSL) with
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the anonymizer, which removes the user id from the query and
forwards it to the LBS. The answer from the LBS is also routed
to Bob through the anonymizer.
Nevertheless, the query itself unintentionally reveals sensitive
information. In our example, the LBS requires the coordinates
of the user in order to process the nearest neighbor (NN) query.
Since the LBS is not trusted, Alice can collaborate with the LBS
and acquire the location of Bob and his query result (i.e., betting
ofﬁce). The next step is to relate the coordinates to a speciﬁc
user. Alice may choose from a variety of techniques such as
physical observation of Bob, triangulating his mobile phone’s
signal1, or consulting publicly available databases. If, for instance,
Bob uses his phone within his residence, Alice can easily convert
the coordinates to a street address (most on-line maps provide
this service) and relate the address to Bob by accessing an on-
line white pages service.
For a broad discussion on the risks of revealing sensitive
information in location-based services see [7]. In practice, users
would be reluctant to access a service that may disclose their po-
litical/religious afﬁliations or alternative lifestyles. Furthermore,
given that the LBS is not trusted, users might be hesitant to ask
innocuous queries such as “ﬁnd the closest gas station” or “which
are the restaurants in my vicinity” since, once their identity is
revealed, they may face unsolicited advertisements, e-coupons,
etc. Motivated by this fact, we develop methods to protect the
privacy of users issuing spatial queries against location-based
attacks. Speciﬁcally, we prevent an attacker from inferring the
identity of the query source by adapting the well established K-
anonymity technique to the spatial domain.
K-anonymity [25], [27] has been used for publishing microdata,
such as census, medical and voting registration data. A dataset
is said to be K-anonymized, if each record is indistinguishable
from at least K-1 other records with respect to certain identifying
attributes. In the context of location based services, the K-
anonymity concept translates as follows: given a query, guarantee
that an attack based on the query location cannot identify the
query source with probability larger than 1/K, among other K-
1 users. Most of the existing work adopts the framework of
Figure 1a. In this framework, a user sends his location and query
to the anonymizer through a secure connection. The anonymizer
removes the id of the user and transforms his location through a
technique called cloaking. Cloaking hides the actual location by a
K-anonymizing spatial region (K-ASR or ASR), which is an area
that encloses the client that issued the query, as well as at least
K-1 other users. The anonymizer then sends the ASR to the LBS,
which returns to the anonymizer a set of candidate results that
satisfy the query condition for any possible point in the ASR. The
1Phone companies can estimate the location of the user within 50-300
meters, as required by the US authorities (E911).
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Fig. 1. Framework and example for spatial K-anonymity
LBS may be compromised, i.e., an adversary may have complete
knowledge of all queries received by the LBS.
Figure 1b illustrates this process in detail, by continuing the
running example. Bob forwards his request to the anonymizer,
together with his anonymity requirement K. Assuming that K=3,
the anonymizer generates a 3-ASR (shaded rectangle) that con-
tains Bob and two other users U1,U 2 (the anonymizer knows the
exact locations of all users). Then, it sends this 3-ASR to the
LBS, which ﬁnds all betting ofﬁces that can be the NN of any
point in the 3-ASR (recall that the LBS does not know where
Bob is). This candidate set (i.e., p1,p 2,p 3,p 4) is returned to the
anonymizer, which ﬁlters the false hits and forwards the actual
NN (in this case p2) to Bob. Even if Alice knows the location
of Bob and the other users, she can only ascertain that the query
originated from Bob with probability 1/3.
Existing methods for spatial K-anonymity (reviewed in Sec-
tion II) have at least one of the following shortcomings: (i) They
compromise the query issuer’s identity for certain user location
distributions. (ii) They sacriﬁce quality of service (QoS), i.e.,
some queries must be delayed or dropped. (iii) They are inefﬁ-
cient, i.e., they generate large ASRs. (iv) They focus exclusively
on cloaking mechanisms and lack algorithms for query processing
at the LBS. In this paper we aim at solving these problems through
a comprehensive set of techniques. Speciﬁcally, we propose two
cloaking algorithms: Nearest Neighbor Cloak that signiﬁcantly
outperforms the existing techniques in terms of efﬁciency but has
similar anonymity problems for some distributions, and Hilbert
Cloak that never reveals the query source, independently of the
user location distribution. Moreover, we address the issue of
anonymized query processing at the LBS. Speciﬁcally, we adopt
an existing algorithm to compute the k nearest neighbors2 (kNN)
of rectangular regions, as opposed to points and develop a novel
algorithm to compute the kNN of circular regions, which reduces
the number of redundant results, hence the communication cost
between the anonymizer and the LBS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
the related work. Next, Section III deals with the construction of
the K-ASR at the anonymizer, followed by Section IV where we
describe the query processing algorithms at the LBS. The results
of our experiments are illustrated in Section V. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper and presents directions for future work.
2Note that k, the number of nearest neighbors is different than K, the degree
of anonymity.
II. RELATED WORK
Section II-A discusses K-anonymity in relational databases and
Section II-B presents privacy-preserving methods for location-
based services. Section II-C overviews related spatial query
processing techniques.
A. K-anonymity in Relational Databases
Anonymity was ﬁrst discussed in relational databases, where
published data (e.g., census, medical) should not be linked to
speciﬁc persons. Adam and Wortmann [1] survey methods for
computing aggregate functions (e.g., sum, count) under the condi-
tion that the results do not reveal any speciﬁc record. Agrawal and
Srikant [3] compute value distributions, suitable for data mining,
in conﬁdential ﬁelds. Recent work has focused on K-anonymity
as deﬁned in [25], [27]: a relation satisﬁes K-anonymity if every
tuple is indistinguishable from at least K-1 other tuples with
respect to a set of quasi-identiﬁer attributes. Quasi-identiﬁers
are attributes (e.g., date of birth, gender, zip code) that can be
linked to publicly available data to identify individuals. Records
with identical quasi-identiﬁers form an anonymized group. Two
techniques are used to transform a relation to a K-anonymized
one: suppression, where some of the attributes or tuples are
removed and generalization, which involves replacing speciﬁc
values (e.g., phone number) with more general ones (e.g., only
area code). Both methods lead to information loss. Algorithms
for anonymizing an entire relation, while preserving as much
information as possible, are discussed in [4], [19]. Xiao and
Tao [31] consider the case where each individual requires a
different degree of anonymity, whereas Aggarwal [2] shows that
anonymizing a high-dimensional relation leads to unacceptable
loss of information due to the dimensionality curse. Machanava-
jjhala et al. [20] propose  -diversity, an anonymization method
that prevents sensitive attribute disclosure by providing diversity
among the sensitive attribute values of each anonymized group.
Finally, [14] employs multi-dimensional to 1-D transformations
to solve efﬁciently the K-anonymity and  -diversity problems.
B. K-anonymity in Location-Based Services
Most previous work on location-based services adopts the
concept of K-anonymity using the framework of Figure 1: a user
sends his position, query and K to the anonymizer, which removes
the id of the user and transforms his location through cloaking.
The generated K-ASR is forwarded to the LBS which processes it
and returns a set of candidates, containing the actual results and
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false hits. The ﬁrst cloaking3 technique, called Interval Cloak
[15] is based on quadtrees. A quadtree [26] recursively partitions
the space into quadrants until the points in each quadrant ﬁt
in a page/node. Figure 2 shows the space partitioning and a
simple quadtree assuming that a node contains a single point. The
anonymizer maintains a quadtree with the locations of all users.
Once it receives a query from a user U, it traverses the quadtree
(top-down) until it ﬁnds the quadrant that contains U and fewer
than K-1 users. Then, it selects the parent of that quadrant as the
K-ASR and forwards it to LBS.
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Fig. 2. Example of Interval Cloak and Casper
Assume that in Figure 2, U1 issues a query with K=2. Quad-
rant4  (0,2),(1,3)  contains only U1, so its parent  (0,2),(2,4) 
becomes the 2-ASR. Note that the ASR may contain more users
than necessary; in this example it includes U1,U 2,U 3, although
2 users would sufﬁce for the privacy requirements. A large ASR
burdens the query processing cost at the LBS and the network
overhead for transferring a large number of candidate results from
the LBS to the anonymizer. In order to overcome this problem,
Gruteser and Grunwald [15] combine temporal cloaking with
spatial cloaking, i.e., the query may wait until K (or more) objects
fall in the user’s quadrant. In our example, the query of U1 will
be executed when a second user enters  (0,2),(1,3) , in which
case  (0,2),(1,3)  is the 2-ASR sent to the LBS.
Similar to Interval Cloak, Casper [23] is based on quadtrees.
The anonymizer uses a hash table on the user id pointing to
the lowest-level quadrant where the user lies. Thus, each user
is located directly, without having to access the quadtree top-
down. Furthermore, the quadtree can be adaptive, i.e., contain
the minimum number of levels that satisﬁes the privacy require-
ments. In Figure 2, for instance, the second level for quadrant
 (0,2),(2,4)  is never used for K≥ 2 and can be omitted. The
only difference in the cloaking algorithms of Casper and Interval
Cloak is that Casper (before using the parent node as the K-
ASR) also considers the neighboring quadrants at the same level
of the tree. Assume again that in Figure 2 U1 issues a query and
K=2. Casper checks the content of quadrants  (1,2),(2,3)  and
 (0,3),(1,4) . Since the ﬁrst one contains user U3, the 2-ASR is
set to  (0,2),(2,3) , which is half the size of the 2-ASR computed
by Interval Cloak (i.e.,  (0,2),(2,4) ).
In Clique Cloak [11], each query deﬁnes an axis-parallel
rectangle whose centroid lies at the user location and whose
extents are Δx,Δy. Figure 3 illustrates the rectangles of three
3Beresford and Stajano [6] introduce the concept of mix zone, which is
similar to the K-ASR, but do not provide concrete algorithms for spatial
cloaking.
4We use the coordinates of the lower-left and upper-right points to denote
a quadrant.
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Fig. 3. Example of Clique Cloak
queries located at U1,U 2,U 3, assuming that they all have the same
Δx and Δy. The anonymizer generates a graph where a vertex
represents a query: two queries are connected if the corresponding
users fall in the rectangles of each other. Then, the graph is
searched for cliques of K vertices and the minimum bounding
rectangle (MBR) of the corresponding rectangles forms the ASR
sent to the LBS. Continuing the example of Figure 3, if K=2, U1
and U2 form a 2-clique and the MBR of their respective rectangles
is forwarded so that both queries are processed together. On the
other hand, U3 cannot be processed immediately, but it has to wait
until a new query (generating a 2-clique with U3) arrives. Clique
Cloak allows users to specify a temporal interval Δt such that,
if a clique cannot be found within Δt, the query is rejected. The
selection of appropriate values for Δx,Δy,Δt is not discussed in
[11].
Probabilistic Cloaking [8] preserves the privacy of locations
without applying spatial K-anonymity. Instead, (i) the ASR is a
closed region around the query point, which is independent of
the number of users inside and (ii) the location of the query
is uniformly distributed in the ASR. Given an ASR, the LBS
returns the probability that each candidate result satisﬁes the
query, based on its location with respect to the ASR. Finally,
location anonymity has also been studied in the context of related
problems. Kamat et al. [18] propose a model for sensor networks
and examine the privacy characteristics of different sensor routing
protocols. Hoh and Gruteser [16] describe techniques for hiding
the trajectory of users in applications that continuously collect
location samples. Ghinita et al. [12], [13] and Chow et al. [10]
study spatial cloaking in peer-to-peer systems.
C. Related Spatial Query Processing Techniques
The LBS maintains the locations of points-of-interest and an-
swers cloaked queries. The most common spatial queries, and the
focus of the existing systems, are ranges and nearest neighbors.
While the cloaking mechanism at the anonymizer is independent
of the query type, query processing at the LBS depends on the
query. Range queries are usually straightforward; assume that a
user U wants to retrieve the data objects within distance d from
his current location. Instead of the position of U, the LBS receives
(from the anonymizer), an ASR that contains U (as well as several
other users) and d. In order to compute the candidate results, the
LBS extends the ASR by d on all dimensions and searches for all
objects in the extended ASR. The set of candidates is returned to
the anonymizer which ﬁlters out false hits and returns the actual
result to U.
The processing of NN queries is more complicated. If the ASR
is an axis-parallel rectangle (as in Interval Cloak, Casper and
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication.TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING 4
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Clique Cloak), then the candidate results can be retrieved using
range nearest neighbor search [17], which ﬁnds the NN of any
point inside a rectangular range. Assume the running example
of Figure 1b, where the ASR is the shaded rectangle. The LBS
must return the NN of every possible location in the ASR. Such
candidate data points lie inside (e.g., p1,p 2), or outside the ASR
(e.g., p3,p 4). For instance, p3 would be the NN for a user at the
lower-right corner of the ASR.
Figure 4 shows the application of range nearest neighbor search
in the above example. The initial set of candidates contains all
points (p1,p 2) inside the input range (i.e., the ASR). Then, four
continuous NN (CNN) queries [29], one for each side of the
ASR, retrieve the remaining candidates. Consider, for instance,
the CNN query for the bottom side se. The initial candidates
split se into two intervals: ss1 and s1e, where s1 is the point
where the perpendicular bisector of p1p2 intersects se. Currently,
the NN of every point in ss1 is p1, whereas the NN of every point
in s1e is p2. The three vicinity circles in Figure 4a, are centered
at s,s1,eand their radii equal the distances between s and p1, s1
and p1 (or p2), and e and p2, respectively. The only data points
that can be closer to se (than p1 and p2) must fall inside some
vicinity circle.
Continuing the example, p3 falls inside the last two vicinity
circles and updates the result as shown in Figure 4b. Speciﬁcally,
s 
1 is the point where the perpendicular bisector of p1p3 intersects
se: p1 becomes the NN of every point in ss 
1, and p3 the NN
of every point in s 
1e. Note that the vicinity circles shrink as
new data points are discovered. The process terminates when no
more points are found within the vicinity circles. It can be shown
[17] that four CNN queries for the four sides of the ASR ﬁnd
all candidate objects. A similar technique (also for rectangular
ranges) is presented for Casper in [23]; in Section IV, we develop
a method capable of processing circular ranges. Next, we proceed
with cloaking techniques at the anonymizer.
III. THE ANONYMIZER
Section III-A presents the basic assumptions and goals of
our techniques. Sections III-B and III-C propose two novel
cloaking techniques, Nearest Neighbor Cloak and Hilbert Cloak,
respectively.
A. Assumptions and Goals of Spatial Anonymization
The anonymizer is a trusted server, which collects the current
location of users and anonymizes their queries. Each query has
a required degree of anonymity K, which ranges between 1
(no privacy requirements) and the user cardinality (maximum
privacy). We assume that an attacker has complete knowledge
of (i) all the ASRs ever received at the LBS, (ii) the cloaking
algorithm used by the anonymizer, and (iii) the locations of all
users. The ﬁrst assumption states that either the LBS is not
trusted (e.g., a commercial service that collects unauthorized
information about its clients for unsolicited advertisements), or
the communication channel between the anonymizer and the LBS
is not secure. The second assumption is common in the security
literature since the data privacy algorithms are usually public.
The third assumption is motivated by the fact that users may
often (or always) issue queries from the same locations (home,
ofﬁce), which may be easily identiﬁed through public databases,
telephone directories, etc. Furthermore, they may reveal their
locations by issuing queries without privacy requirements. In
scenarios with highly mobile users, the attacker may not be able
to learn exact user locations. However, one can argue that in these
cases spatial K-anonymity is not important, because (i) the user
ids are removed by the anonymizer anyway, and (ii) a query at
a random position does not necessarily reveal information about
the identity of the corresponding user. However, in practice, a
determined attacker may be able to acquire (through triangulation,
public databases, physical observation, etc.) the locations of at
least a few users in the vicinity of the targeted victim.
Similar to existing work on LBS query privacy [10], [15], [23]
we focus on snapshot queries, where the attacker uses current
data, but not historical information about movement and behavior
patterns of particular clients (e.g., a user often asking a particular
query at a certain location or time). This assumption is reasonable
in practice, because if a client obtains the items of interest (e.g.,
the closest restaurant), it is unlikely to ask the same query from
the same location again in the future. We also assume that the
attacker does not have a priori knowledge of the user query
frequencies (i.e., a query may originate from any user with equal
probability). Furthermore, the value of K is not subject to attacks
since it is transferred from the client to the anonymizer through
a secure channel.
Given a query, the anonymizer removes the user id, applies
cloaking to hide the user’s location through an ASR, and forwards
the ASR to the LBS. The cloaking algorithm is said to preserve
spatial K-anonymity, if the probability of the attacker pinpointing
the query source under the above assumptions does not exceed
1/K.
Note that simply generating an ASR that includes K users is
not sufﬁcient for spatial K-anonymity. Consider for instance, a
na¨ ıve algorithm, called Center Cloak (CC) in the sequel, which
given a query from U, ﬁnds his K-1 closest users, and sets the
ASR as the minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) or circle (MBC)
that encloses them. In fact, a similar technique is proposed in
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[10] for anonymization in peer-to-peer systems, i.e., the K-ASR
contains the query issuing peer and its K-1 nearest nodes. CC is
likely to disclose the location of U under the center-of-ASR attack.
Speciﬁcally, let indexU be the position of U in the sequence of
users enclosed by the K-ASR, sorted in ascending order of their
distance from the center of the K-ASR; for example, if indexU =
1, then U is the closest user to the center. The center-of-ASR attack
is successful if P[indexU =1 ]> 1/K, i.e., if the probability of
U being the closest user to the center exceeds 1/K.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the positions of U inside an
MBR enclosing its 9 NNs (for details of the experimental setting,
see Section V). In most cases, U is close to the center of the
10-ASR (i.e., P[indexU =1 ]> 1/10). Hence, an attacker with
knowledge of the cloaking algorithm (assumption ii) may easily
pinpoint U as the query source. Note that, since the MBR may
enclose more than 10 users it is possible to get P[indexU = i] > 0
for i>10. The dashed line in the graph corresponds to the “ﬂat”
index distribution obtained by an ideal anonymization technique,
which would always generate 10-ASRs with exactly 10 users.
In addition to the preservation of spatial K-anonymity, we
deﬁne the following objectives of cloaking:
1) The generated ASR should be as small as possible.
2) The cloaking algorithm should not compromise the quality
of service (QoS).
3) The ASR should not reveal the exact location of any user.
Goal 1 is induced by the fact that a large ASR incurs higher
processing overhead (at the LBS) and network cost (for trans-
ferring a large number of candidate results from the LBS to
the anonymizer). In real-world services, users may be charged
depending on the overhead that the anonymization requirements
impose on the system. Note that, as long as the anonymity
requirements of the user are satisﬁed, the size of the ASR is
irrelevant in terms of K-anonymity. Goal 2 states that systems that
delay or reject service requests, such as Clique Cloak [11], are
unacceptable. In general, since temporal cloaking compromises
QoS, we focus our attention on spatial cloaking. Goal 3 ensures
that the anonymizer does not help the attacker obtain the locations
of users through the cloaking algorithm (although, as discussed
before, he may obtain them through other means). The disclosure
of exact locations by a service is undesirable to most users
(independently of their queries), and in some cases forbidden
by law. As an example, consider that the anonymizer picks K-1
random users and sends K independent queries (including the real
one) to the LBS. This method achieves spatial K-anonymity, but
reveals the exact locations of K users. Furthermore, it has several
efﬁciency problems: (i) depending on the value of K, a potentially
large number of locations are transmitted to the LBS and (ii) the
LBS has to process K independent queries and send back all their
results.
Let U be the user issuing a query. The proposed cloaking
algorithms ﬁrst generate an anonymizing set (AS) that contains
U and at least K-1 users in his vicinity. The ASR is an area
that encloses all users in AS. Although the ASR can have
arbitrary shape, we use minimum bounding rectangles (MBR) or
circles (MBC) because they incur small network overhead (when
transmitted to the LBS) and facilitate query processing. Note that,
in addition to AS, the ASR may enclose some additional users
that fall in the corresponding MBR or MBC.
B. Nearest Neighbor Cloak
The ﬁrst algorithm, Nearest Neighbor Cloak (NNC), is a ran-
domized variant of Center Cloak, and is not vulnerable to center-
of-ASR attacks. Given a query from U, NNC ﬁrst determines the
set S0 containing U and his K-1 nearest users. Then, it selects a
random user Ui from S0 (the probability of selecting the initial
user U is 1/K) and computes the set S1, which includes Ui and his
K-1 NNs. Finally, NNC obtains S2 = S1∪U, i.e., S2 corresponds
to the anonymizing set. This step is essential, since U is not
necessarily among the NNs of Ui. The K-ASR is the MBR or
MBC enclosing all users in S2.
Figure 6 shows an example of NNC, where U1 issues a query
with K=3. The 2 NNs of U1 are U2,U 3, and S0 = {U1,U 2,U 3}.
NNC randomly chooses U3 and issues a 2-NN query, forming
S1 = {U3,U 4,U 5}. The 3-ASR is the MBR enclosing S2 =
{U1,U 3,U 4,U 5}. NNC can be used with variable values of K.I t
is not vulnerable to the center-of-ASR attack since the probability
of U being near the center of the K-ASR is at most 1/K (due to
the random choice). Furthermore, as we show in the experimental
evaluation, the ASR is much smaller than that of Interval Cloak
and Casper.
 
U
2
U 1
U
3
U 4
U 5
U 6
U 7
U8
U9
U10
3-ASR for U1
 
Fig. 6. Example of NNC
However, NNC, as well as Interval Cloak and Casper, may
compromise location anonymity in the presence of outliers.
Consider that in Figure 6, an adversary knows the locations of
the users and the value of K. Then, he can be sure that the
query originated from U1 because if it were issued by any other
user (U3,U 4,U 5) in the 3-ASR, the ASR would not contain U1.
For Interval Cloak and Casper we use the example of Figure 2
assuming that K= 2. If a query originates from U1,U 2,o rU3, the
2-ASR of Interval Cloak is quadrant  (0,2),(2,4) . Similarly, the
2-ASR of Casper is the concatenation of two sibling quadrants
at level 2 (e.g.,  (0,2),(1,3)  and  (1,2),(2,3) ). On the other
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Fig. 7. Location anonymity compromise in the presence of outliers
hand, if a query originates from U4, the 2-ASR is the entire data-
space  (0,0),(4,4) ) for both Interval Cloak and Casper. Thus,
an attacker can identify U4 for all 2-ASRs that cover the entire
data-space.
For illustration purposes, in the above examples we assumed
that the attacker knows K, although as discussed in Section III-
A, K is not subject to attacks. Nevertheless, even for variable
and unknown K, the presence of outliers may compromise spatial
anonymity. We demonstrate the problem for Interval Cloak and
Casper using Figure 7. There is a single user U1 in quadrant
 (0,0),(1,1)  and N − 1 users in  (1,1),(2,2) , where N is
the user cardinality. Quadrant  (1,1),(2,2)  may be subdivided
further, but this is not important for our discussion. Each user has
equal probability to issue a query, and the degree of anonymity
required by different queries distributes uniformly in the range
[1,N]. The term event signiﬁes the issuance of a query with
anonymity degree K at a random user U. Then, an ASR covering
the entire data space is generated by (i) a query originating from
U1 and 2 ≤ K ≤ N (i.e., N −1 events), or (ii) a query originating
from another user and K= N (i.e., N − 1 events). Thus, if the
attacker detects such an ASR and has knowledge of the user
distribution (assumption iii in Section III-A), then he concludes
that it originated from U1 with probability 1/2. Thus, the spatial
anonymity of U1 is breached for all values K> 2.
In general, following a similar analysis it can be shown that,
if the two quadrants contain a different number of users, the
location anonymity is compromised (for all values of K exceeding
a threshold) in the quadrant containing the smaller number.
Analogous examples can be constructed for NNC. Next, we
propose an algorithm that avoids this problem.
C. Hilbert Cloak
Hilbert Cloak (HC) satisﬁes reciprocity, an important property
that is sufﬁcient for spatial K-anonymity.
Deﬁnition 1 (Reciprocity): Consider a user U issuing a query
with anonymity degree K, associated anonymizing set AS, and
anonymizing spatial region K-ASR. AS satisﬁes the reciprocity
property if (i) it contains U and at least K-1 additional users and
(ii) every user in AS also generates the same anonymizing set
AS for the given K. The second condition implies that each user
in AS lies in the K-ASRs of all other users in AS.
In general, Interval Cloak, Casper and NNC do not satisfy
reciprocity as they violate condition (ii). For instance, in the
example of Figure 7, although users U2 ...U N lie in the K-ASR
of U1, U1 is not in the K-ASR of U2 ...U N for 2 ≤K<N .
Similarly for NNC, although in Figure 6 U3 ...U 5 are in the 3-
ASR of U1, U1 is not in the 3-ASR of U3 ...U 5.
Theorem 1: A spatial cloaking algorithm guarantees spatial
K-anonymity, if every anonymizing set satisﬁes the reciprocity
property.
Proof: Since every anonymizing set satisﬁes reciprocity, a
K-ASR may have originated from every user in the corresponding
anonymizing set AS with equal probability 1/|AS|, where |AS|
is the cardinality of AS. Because |AS|≥ K, the probability of
identifying the query issuer does not exceed 1/K.
An optimal cloaking algorithm would partition the user popu-
lation into anonymizing sets that yield minimal ASRs and obey
the reciprocity property. However calculating such an optimal
partitioning is NP-Hard [21] and would require a ﬁxed K by all
queries. HC overcomes these problems by utilizing the Hilbert
space-ﬁlling curve [22] to generate small (but not necessarily
optimal) ASRs for variable values of K. The Hilbert space ﬁlling
curve transforms the 2-D coordinates of each user into a 1-D
value H(U). Figure 8 illustrates the Hilbert curves for a 2-D space
using a 4×4 and 8×8 space partitioning. With high probability
[24], if two points are in close proximity in the 2-D space, they
will also be close in the 1-D transformation. A major beneﬁt
of Hilbert (and similar) curves, is that they permit the indexing
of multidimensional objects through one-dimensional structures
(e.g., B-trees).
1
4
5
11 10 7 6
12 9 8
13 14 3
16 15 2
Fig. 8. Hilbert Curve (left: 4 × 4, right: 8 × 8)
Given a query from user U with anonymity requirement K,
HC sorts the Hilbert values and splits them into K-buckets. Each
K-bucket has exactly K users, except the last one which may
contain up to 2·K-1 users. Let H(U) be the Hilbert value of U
and rankU be the position of H(U) in the sorted sequence of
all locations. HC identiﬁes the K-bucket containing rankU. The
users in that K-bucket constitute the corresponding AS. Figure 9
illustrates an example, where the user ids indicate their Hilbert
order. For K=3, the users are grouped into 3 buckets (the last one
contains 4 users). When any of U1,U 2 or U3 issues a query, HC
returns the ﬁrst bucket (shown shaded) as the AS; the MBR (or
MBC) of that bucket becomes the 3-ASR.
HC is reciprocal because all users in the same bucket share the
same K-ASR; therefore, it guarantees spatial anonymity according
to Theorem 1. Furthermore, it can deal with variable values of K
by not physically storing the K-buckets. Instead, it maintains a
balanced sorting tree, which indexes the Hilbert values. When a
user U initiates a query with anonymity degree K, HC performs a
search for H(U) in the index and computes rankU. From rankU,
we calculate the start and end positions deﬁning the K-bucket that
includes H(U), as follows:
start = rankU −(rankU mod K), end = start+K−1
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Fig. 9. Example of Hilbert Cloak
The complexity of the in-order tree traversal is O(N), where N
is the number of indexed users. To compute rankU efﬁciently, we
use an aggregate tree [28], where each node w stores the number
wcount of nodes in its left subtree (including itself). Using this
data structure, rankU is calculated in O(logN) as follows: we
initialize rankU to zero and perform a normal lookup for H(U).
For every node w we visit, we add wcount to rankU only if
we follow a right branch. The complexity of maintaining the ag-
gregate information is O(logN) because changes are propagated
from the leaves to the root. Since the complexity of constructing
the K-ASR is O(logN + K), whereas search, insert and delete
cost O(logN), the data structure is scalable. Therefore, HC is
applicable to a large number of mobile users who update their
location frequently and have varying requirements for the degree
of anonymity. Note that, while our description assumes a main
memory index, the technique can be easily extended to secondary
memory by using B+-trees.
IV. LOCATION-BASED SERVICE
The Location-Based Service (LBS) receives the query from
the anonymizer, processes it and sends the results back to the
anonymizer. In our implementation, the data in the LBS are in-
dexed by an R*-Tree [5]; our methods, however, are independent
of the index structure. We support two types of queries:
1) Range queries: The LBS receives the query range which is
either an axis-parallel rectangle R or a circle C. Processing
is straight-forward; the R-tree is traversed from the root to
the leaves and any object inside R (or C) is returned.
2) kNN queries: This case is more complex, since the LBS
must ﬁnd the k nearest neighbors of the entire range. For
rectangular ranges, we adopt the Range Nearest Neighbor
(RkNN) algorithm [17] (see Section II-C for details). The
rest of this section describes our CkNN algorithm, which
computes the kNNs of circular ranges.
A. CkNN - Circular Range kNN
Similar to rectangular ranges [17], the set of kNNs of a circular
range C also consists of two subsets of objects: (i) all the objects
inside C and (ii) the kNNs of the circumference of C. The objects
in (i) are retrieved by a range query; in the rest of the section,
we present the novel CkNN-Circ algorithm which computes the
kNNs of the circumference of C. Intuitively CkNN-Circ is similar
to CNN (see Section II-C). However, some of the properties of 1-
D shapes which are used in CNN (e.g., continuity by the deﬁnition
of [29]) do not hold for 2-D shapes, rendering the problem more
complex.
Conceptually, CkNN-Circ partitions the circumference of C into
disjoint arcs, and associates to each arc the data objects nearest
to it. Consider the example of Figure 10, where p1, p2 and p3
are the data objects. Let s0,s 1 be the intersection points of the
perpendicular bisector of p1p2 (denoted by ⊥p1p2) with C, i.e.,
|p1s0| = |s0p2| and |p1s1| = |s1p2|. Assuming that the center c
of C is the origin of the coordinate system, the polar coordinates
of s0 are (r, ˆ s0), where r is the radius of C and ˆ s0 is the (anti-
clockwise) angle between the x-axis and the vector   cs0. Similarly,
the polar coordinates of s1 are (r, ˆ s1). The NN of every point in
the arc [ˆ s0, ˆ s1] is p1; we denote this as: [ˆ s0, ˆ s1] → p1. Likewise
[ˆ s1, ˆ s0] → p2, since any point in the arc [ˆ s1, ˆ s0] is closer to p2 than
to any other object. Therefore, the set of NNs of C is {p1,p 2}.
Note that p3 is not in this set, even though it is closer to C than
p2, because p1 is closer than p3 to any point on C; we say that
p1 covers p3.
c r
p 3 p 1 1 s
1 s
0 s
0 s p 2
Fig. 10. The 1-NNs of C are p1 and p2
Let D = {p1,p 2,...,p n} be the set of all data objects. CkNN-
Circ maintains a list SL of mappings [a,b] → pi, where a,b are
angles deﬁning an arc on C, 0 ≤ a<b≤ 2π, and pi ∈Dis
the object which is closest to every point of arc [a,b] than any
other object pj ∈D . The CkNN-Circ pseudocode is shown in
Figure 13.
In the example of Figure 11a, let p1 ∈Dbe the ﬁrst object
encountered by the algorithm. Since SL is initially empty, p1
is closest to the entire C. Without loss of generality, we pick
two points s0,s  
0 ∈C , where ˆ s0 =0and ˆ s 
0 =2 π (i.e., they
are the same point), and insert the mapping [ˆ s0, ˆ s 
0] → p1 into
SL (line 2 of the pseudocode). For each subsequent point p ∈
D, the algorithm traverses SL (line 4) and examines all existing
mappings [a,b] → q. There are three possible cases:
c c
(a) (b)
r
1 p
s' 0
0 s
s' 0
p 1p 2
2 p
1 p
s' 0
0 s
Fig. 11. CkNN example: The perpendicular bisector does not intersect C
Case 1: ⊥pq∩C= ∅ or ⊥pq is tangent to C (lines 5-6). This
case is exempliﬁed5 in Figure 11b. The only existing mapping is
[ˆ s0, ˆ s 
0] → p1, and p2 is processed next. Any point on the right-
hand side of ⊥p1p2, is closer to p1. Therefore, the entire C is
closer to p1 than to p2. Since the mapping to p1 already exists,
there is no change in SL. Furthermore, even if there were more
5For simplicity, all objects are shown outside C. However, the algorithm
also works for objects inside C.
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mappings inside SL, it would not be necessary to compare with
p2, since p1 covers p2. On the other hand, if p2 was at the right-
hand side (and p1 on the left), then p2 would be closer to C than
p1. In this case, the algorithm would remove the [ˆ s0, ˆ s 
0] → p1
mapping from SL and add a new one [ˆ s0, ˆ s 
0] → p2 (line 6).
Case 2: ⊥pq∩C= {s0,s 1} and either ˆ s0 ∈ [a,b] or ˆ s1 ∈ [a,b]
(lines 12-14). This case is illustrated in Figure 12a: both p1 and
p2 have already been processed, and there are two mappings in
SL: [ˆ s1, ˆ s 
1] → p1 and [ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s1] → p2. Let p3 be the next object to
be processed. p3 is compared against the existing mappings. For
the ﬁrst one (i.e., [ˆ s1, ˆ s 
1] → p1), ⊥p1p3 intersects C at s2 and
s 
2. Note that ˆ s 
2  ∈ [ˆ s1, ˆ s 
1], so it is not considered further. On the
other hand, ˆ s2 ∈ [ˆ s1, ˆ s 
1] and p3 is closer to s1 than p1. Therefore
(line 13), the arc is split into two parts [ˆ s1, ˆ s2] and [ˆ s2, ˆ s 
1], which
are assigned to p3 and p1, respectively. Similarly, for the second
mapping (i.e., [ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s1] → p2), ⊥p2p3 intersects C at s3,s  
3. Only
ˆ s3 ∈ [ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s1], so the arc is split into [ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s3] and [ˆ s3, ˆ s1], which
are assigned to p2 and p3, respectively. After updating, SL =
{[ˆ s2, ˆ s 
1] → p1,[ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s3] → p2,[ˆ s3, ˆ s1] → p3,[ˆ s1, ˆ s2] → p3}. The
last two mappings can be combined (i.e., [ˆ s3, ˆ s2] → p3) since
they are consecutive and are mapped to the same object.
(a) (b)
p 3
p 1
s2
s' 3
s1
3 s
s' 2
p 2 s' 1
p 1
p 3
p 2
s2
s1
3 s
s' 2
s' 1
s' 3
Fig. 12. The perpendicular bisector intersects C
Case 3: ⊥pq∩C= {s0,s 1} and both ˆ s0, ˆ s1 ∈ [a,b] (lines 9-11).
This case is illustrated in Figure 12b: again, both p1 and p2 have
already been processed, and SL = {[ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s1] → p1,[ˆ s1, ˆ s 
1] → p2}.
Next, p3 is compared to the ﬁrst mapping of SL. Note that ⊥p1p3
intersects C at s 
2, s2 and both ˆ s 
2, ˆ s2 ∈ [ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s1]. Therefore (line
10), the arc is split into three parts and since p3 is closer to s 
1
than p1 the corresponding mappings are: [ ˆ s 
1, ˆ s 
2] → p3,[ ˆ s 
2, ˆ s2] →
p1,[ˆ s2, ˆ s1] → p3. Similarly, after considering ⊥p2p3, [ˆ s1, ˆ s 
1] is
also split into three parts. Finally, after combining the consecutive
mappings, SL = {[ ˆ s 
2, ˆ s2] → p1,[ˆ s2, ˆ s3] → p3,[ˆ s3, ˆ s 
3] →
p2,[ ˆ s 
3, ˆ s 
2] → p3}.
For simplicity, the pseudocode of Figure 13 computes only the
1-NNs. To compute the kNNs, instead of a single object, the
arcs in our implementation are mapped to an ordered list of k
objects: [a,b] → (p1,...,p k), where p1 is the nearest neighbor
of arc [a,b], p2 is the second NN of arc [a,b], etc. The procedure
is called for each position i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) of the ordered list.
In the ith call, if an object p ∈Dalready exists in position j
(1 ≤ j ≤ i−1), then p is not considered for that mapping. Also,
if an arc is split, the objects in positions 1...i− 1 (i.e. the i − 1
nearest neighbors found already) are not altered. The worst case
complexity of CkNN is O(|D|k), since any object may cause an
arc split. In practice, however, the algorithm is faster, because the
objects which are far away from C do not cause splits.
CkNN-Circ(D: the set of objects)
1. for every object p ∈Ddo
2. if SL = ∅ then SL := {[0,2π] → p}
3. else
4. for every interval ϕ ≡ [a,b] → q,ϕ ∈ SL do
5. if ⊥pq∩C = ∅ or ⊥pq is tangent to C then
6. if |pC| < |qC| then SL := (SL− ϕ) ∪{ [a,b] → p}
else break
7. else
8. let s0,s 1 be two points such that ⊥pq∩C = {s0,s 1}
9. if ˆ s0 ∈ [a,b] and ˆ s1 ∈ [a,b] then
// Assume ˆ s0 < ˆ s1 (the other case is symmetric)
10. if |pCa| < |qCa| then SL := (SL− ϕ)∪
∪{[a, ˆ s0] → p,[ˆ s0, ˆ s1] → q,[ˆ s1,b] → p}
// Ca, Cb are the endpoints of arc [a,b]
11. else SL := (SL− ϕ)∪
∪{[a, ˆ s0] → q,[ˆ s0, ˆ s1] → p,[ˆ s1,b] → q}
12. else if ˆ s0 ∈ [a,b] or ˆ s1 ∈ [a,b] then
// Let only ˆ s0 ∈ [a,b] ( ˆ s1 ∈ [a,b] is symmetric)
13. if |pCa| < |qCa| then SL := (SL− ϕ)∪
∪{[a, ˆ s0] → p,[ˆ s0,b] → q}
14. else SL := (SL− ϕ) ∪{ [a, ˆ s0] → q,[ˆ s0,b] → p}
15. else if |pCa| < |qCa| then
SL := (SL− ϕ) ∪{ [a,b] → p}
16. return SL
CkNN(D: the set of objects)
1. call CkNN-Circ(D)
2. return {p : p ∈D∧p is inside C}∪
∪{p : p belongs to a mapping of SL}
Fig. 13. Find the 1-NNs of a circular range C
B. R-trees and CkNN
In order to use the CkNN algorithm with an R-tree, we employ
a branch-and-bound heuristic. Starting from the root, the R-tree is
traversed either in Depth-First or in Best-First [29] manner. When
a leaf entry (i.e., object) p is encountered, the CkNN algorithm is
used to check whether p is closer to C than any of the objects in
the current mappings (i.e., p is a qualifying object) and updates
SL accordingly. For an intermediate entry E we avoid visiting
its subtree if it is impossible to contain any qualifying object.
Figure 14 presents an example where p1 and p2 are the current
1-NNs of C. Next, an entry E from an intermediate node of the
R-tree is encountered. We observe the following:
Lemma 1: Let MBRE be an axis-parallel MBR and let st be
the side which is closest to circle C.I fst does not contain any of
the kNNs of C, then MBRE cannot contain any kNN.
d
e
c
f
E r
s
t
p 1
2 p
Fig. 14. Check if E may contain qualifying objects
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The proof is straight-forward, since any point in the MBR
will be further away from C than the closest point on st. In our
example, the right side st of E is closer to C. Assume there is a
point d on st, such that the perpendicular bisector ⊥dp1 is tangent
to C, and let e ≡⊥ dp1∩C. Then we get the following system of
equations6:
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
|ce| = r
|p1e| = |de|
|p1e|2 −| p1f|2 = |cf|2 − r2
(1)
The ﬁrst equation is derived from the fact that e ∈C , while the
second one is because the distance from any point on ⊥dp1 to d
and p1 is equal. The third equation results from the application of
the Pythagorean theorem on the orthogonal triangles p1feand fec
which have a common side ef. After substituting the points with
their Cartesian coordinates, we get the following system (note
that xf =
xd+xp1
2 ,y f =
yd+yp1
2 , since f is the middle of dp1):
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(xe − xc)2 +( ye − yc)2 = r2
(xd − xe)2 +( yd − ye)2 =( xp1 − xe)2 +( yp1 − ye)2
(xp1 − xe)2 +( yp1 − ye)2 −
(xd−xp1)
2+(yd−yp1)
2
4 =
=
 
xd+xp1
2 − xc
 2
+
 
yd+yp1
2 − yc
 2
− r2
There are three equations and three unknowns: xe,y e,y d.I f
there is a real solution to this system, under the condition
(xd,y d) ∈ st, then there may be a qualifying object inside the
subtree of E. Else all objects in E are further away from C than
the current objects in SL, so the subtree under E can be pruned.
Solving this system, however, is slow (in the order of 100’s
of msec in an average computer); given that an entry E must be
checked against many objects, the running time is prohibitively
long. Therefore, in our implementation, we use the RkNN al-
gorithm to traverse the R-tree and employ the CkNN algorithm
only for the objects at the leaf-level. Our strategy is based on the
following observation:
Lemma 2: Let C be a circle, MER the maximum enclosed
axis-parallel rectangle of C and S the set of kNNs of MER’s
perimeter. Let pi be an object, such that pi is inside MER and
pi  ∈ S. Then pi cannot be a kNN for any point of C.
d
e
MBR of C
MER of C
C
p 2
p 1
Fig. 15. The MBR and the MER of C
Proof: Assume the lemma does not hold. Figure 15 shows
an example where p2 is inside MER and p2  ∈ S. Assume that
p2 is the NN of point e ∈C . Let d be the point where the line
segment p2e intersects the perimeter of MER, and p1 be the
object which is the NN of d. It follows from our hypothesis that:
|p2e| < |p1e|. Using the triangular inequality, we get: |p2d| +
6If a different side of E is closer to C, the equations are modiﬁed
accordingly.
Fig. 16. North-America (NA) dataset
|de| < |p1d| + |de|⇒| p2d| < |p1d| which is a contradiction,
since p1 is the NN of d. Therefore, the lemma holds.
We construct the Minimum Bounding Rectangle7 MBR and
the Maximum Enclosed Rectangle MER of C (the side-length of
MER is
√
2r). Conceptually, our implementation works in three
steps:
1) Use the RkNN algorithm to ﬁnd the set S1 of kNNs of
MBR (including all the objects inside MBR). Recall that
S1 is a superset of the kNNs of any point inside MBR;
therefore, it contains all the kNNs of C.
2) Use CNN (see Section II-C) to ﬁnd the set S2 of kNNs of
only the perimeter of MER. Use Lemma 2 and S2 to prune
objects from S1.
3) Call the CkNN algorithm with the objects remaining in S1.
In practice, these steps can be combined. In a single traversal of
the R-tree, steps (1) and (2) can be used at the intermediate levels
to prune the tree and step (3) is applied on the leaf-level objects.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section evaluates the proposed anonymization and query
processing algorithms. We implemented prototypes for both the
anonymizer and the LBS using C++. All experiments were exe-
cuted on an Intel Xeon 2.8GHz machine with 2.5GB of RAM and
Linux OS. Our workload for user positions and landmarks/points
of interest consists of the NA dataset [30], which contains
569K locations on the North-American continent (Figure 16).
Performance is measured in terms of CPU time, I/O time and
communication cost. At the anonymizer we employed main-
memory structures, therefore we measured only the CPU time.
At the LBS, we used an R*-Tree and measured the total time
(i.e., I/O and CPU time); in all experiments we maintained a
cache with size equal to 10% of the corresponding R*-Tree.
The communication cost was measured in terms of number of
candidates sent from the LBS back to the anonymizer.
In the following, Section V-A focuses on cloaking algorithms at
the anonymizer, whereas Section V-B evaluates query processing
at the LBS.
A. Anonymizer Evaluation
We compare the proposed Nearest Neighbor Cloak (NNC) and
Hilbert Cloak (HC) against Casper and Interval Cloak (IC). The
ﬁrst experiment measures the area of rectangular K-ASRs. Recall
that we wish to minimize the ASR area, since it affects the
processing time at the LBS and the communication cost between
7For a set of users U1...n, the MBR of C is not the same as their
corresponding anonymizing rectangle R.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication.TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING 10
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160
A
r
e
a
 
(
%
 
o
f
 
D
a
t
a
S
p
a
c
e
)
K
HC
NNC
IntervalCloak
Casper
(a) Varying K, N=50000
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 50k  100k  150k  200k  250k  300k
A
r
e
a
 
(
%
 
o
f
 
D
a
t
a
S
p
a
c
e
)
N
HC
NNC
IntervalCloak
Casper
(b) Varying N, K=80
Fig. 17. Area of rectangular K-ASR
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Fig. 18. K-ASR generation time
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Fig. 19. Rectangular vs Smallest Area K-ASR, Nearest Neighbor Cloak
the LBS and the anonymizer. First, we ﬁx the number of users
N = 50000 and vary the degree of anonymity K. The K-ASR area
is expressed as a percentage of the entire data space. We generated
1000 queries originating at random users. Figure 17a shows the
average area per query. Clearly IC is the worst algorithm, whereas
NNC is the best. HC and Casper exhibit similar behavior to each
other. All algorithms scale linearly with K in terms of ASR area.
Figure 17b, shows the K-ASR area for K = 80 and varying N.
Since the extent of the data space remains constant, an increase in
user population translates to higher user density, hence reduced
K-ASR size for all methods. The relative performance among
the algorithms remains the same. Observe that HC and Casper
outperform IC, and generate ASRs with roughly twice the area
of NNC.
Figure 18 shows the average ASR generation time (in millisec-
onds) for varying K and N. HC, IC and Casper behave similarly.
NNC, on the other hand, has a signiﬁcantly larger generation time,
due to the more costly nearest-neighbor search. Nevertheless, we
will show in the following that NNC is best in terms of overhead
at the LBS.
So far, we focused on rectangular K-ASRs. However, depend-
ing on the user distribution, circular K-ASRs may have smaller
size. Here we adopt a simple optimization: ﬁrst we identify
the set of users which belong to a K-ASR. Then we calculate
the minimum bounding rectangle R and the minimum enclosing
circle C of the K-ASR, and select the shape with the smallest area.
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We call this method SA. NNC is more suitable to be combined
with SA, since the nearest neighbor search tends to identify
circular clusters of users. Figures 19a and 19b compare the
rectangle-only approach against the SA optimization for varying
K and N, respectively. SA manages to reduce the K-ASR area
by up to 15%.
Finally, we measure the anonymity strength of the above-
mentioned algorithms against the center-of-ASR attack8. We con-
sider a workload of 1000 queries, originating at a set of random
users, with K = 50. Figure 20 shows the probability P[indexU =
i] (the experiment is similar to that of Section III-A). Recall
that indexU =1means that user U is the closest to the center
of the K-ASR. Furthermore, the dashed line corresponds to the
distribution of indexU for the ideal anonymization technique. All
studied algorithms preserve privacy in the case of the center-of-
ASR attack. NNC is close to the ideal distribution and there are
few cases where the K-ASR encloses more than K users, which
explains the relatively small ASR size observed in the previous
experiments. HC and Casper exhibit similar behavior to each
other, but include a larger number of redundant users inside the
K-ASR, compared to NNC; this is why P[indexU = i] > 0 for
i>K. However, they are both better than IC.
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
P
[
i
n
d
e
x
U
=
i
]
i
HC
NNC
IntervalCloak
Casper
Fig. 20. center-of-ASR attack, K=5 0
B. Location-Based Service Evaluation
For this experiment, we generate 1000 queries originating at
random users. The corresponding K-ASRs are sent to the LBS and
the queries are executed against the entire NA dataset, which is
indexed by an R*-tree. For all K-ASR generation techniques, we
compare the average processing time (i.e, CPU plus I/O time)
per query, and the size of the candidate set. The latter is a
superset of the actual result, and it reﬂects the communication cost
between the LBS and the anonymizer. First, we focus on kNN
queries. Figure 21 shows the performance for varying number of
nearest neighbors k. NNC generates a signiﬁcantly lower number
of candidates compared to the other techniques. This is expected,
since the sizes of the corresponding K-ASRs are also smaller.
HC and Casper generate up to 50% more candidates than NNC.
However, they both outperform IC by a large margin. In terms
of processing time, NNC is the fastest, with HC and Casper
considerably better than IC.
In Figure 22 we ﬁx the number of neighbors k =2and vary
the degree of anonymity K. Again, NNC performs best, followed
8Although we formally proved that Hilbert Cloak guarantees location
anonymity, we include this experiment for illustration purposes.
by HC and Casper. The difference is more signiﬁcant for larger
K values, as the average size of the K-ASR increases. Figure 23
shows the number of candidates and processing time for varying
N. Note that more users lead to higher density, thus smaller K-
ASRs. Consequently, the number of candidates and the average
processing time decrease with N.
We also evaluated the performance of the four techniques for
range queries. The results are presented in Figure 24 for varying
K and N = 50000. Again, we observe a signiﬁcant advantage of
NNC over the other techniques, while HC and Casper outperform
IC in terms of both processing cost and candidate set size. The
trends for varying N are similar.
The previous results were obtained for rectangular K-ASRs.
We also investigated the effect of the SA (i.e., smallest area)
optimization on query processing. For a given K-ASR, if SA
generates a circular range C, we employ CkNN to execute
the corresponding kNN query. For our workload, SA generated
circular ranges for around 45% of the K-ASRs when K was small,
and up to 90% for large values of K. Figure 25 compares SA
against the rectangles-only approach for k =2neighbors and
varying K. SA reduces the number of candidates by up to 18%,
compared to the rectangular K-ASR. The tradeoff is the increased
processing time. The same relative performance is observed in
Figure 26, where we vary N.
C. Discussion
The experimental evaluation veriﬁes the superiority of Hilbert
Cloak and Nearest Neighbor Cloak, compared to the existing
approaches. Our HC algorithm provides privacy guarantees under
all user and query distributions, and its overhead in terms of ASR
generation time, query processing time and communication cost
is similar to Casper, the most recent and most efﬁcient technique.
On the other hand, NNC clearly outperforms Casper in terms of
overhead at the LBS, while offering similar anonymity strength.
The LBS is likely to maintain huge volumes of data and
disk-based data structures, while the anonymizer typically uses
memory-based data structures. For this reason, the query overhead
at the LBS is considerably larger than at the anonymizer (observe
that time is measured in milliseconds in Figure 18 instead of sec-
onds in Figure 21b). Under these circumstances, the reduced LBS
processing cost offers NNC an important performance advantage,
despite its increased K-ASR generation time.
The choice between Hilbert Cloak and Nearest Neighbor Cloak
involves a clear trade-off between privacy guarantees on one hand,
and processing overhead on the other. If provable anonymity guar-
antees are required, Hilbert Cloak is the only option. Nevertheless,
Nearest Neighbor Cloak also achieves strong anonymity for most
of the cases, and may be acceptable for applications where outliers
do not constitute an anonymity threat (e.g., very frequent user
movement) and efﬁciency is crucial.
Finally, there is a tradeoff between rectangular-only K-ASRs
and the SA optimization. The cost of CkNN at the LBS is higher
than RkNN. However, CkNN reduces the number of candidates.
Therefore, CkNN is preferable if the communication cost is more
important than the processing cost at the LBS. In practice, this
happens if a single anonymizer sends queries to several LBSs.
In this case the bandwidth of the single anonymizer is shared
among all connections. Thus, it is important to minimize the
communication cost, whereas the processing cost is distributed
among the LBSs.
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Fig. 21. kNN queries, varying number of neighbors, N = 50000, K =8 0
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Fig. 22. kNN queries, varying K, k =2neighbors, N = 50000
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Fig. 23. kNN queries, varying N, k =2neighbors, K =8 0
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Fig. 24. Range queries, N = 50000, varying K
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Fig. 25. NNC, rectangular vs SA K-ASR, k =2neighbors, N = 50000, varying K
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Fig. 26. NNC, rectangular vs SA K-ASR, k =2neighbors, varying N, K =8 0
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we studied the preservation of query anonymity
in Location Based Services. The main idea is to conceal the user
coordinates, by replacing them with a spatial region (either a
circle or a rectangle). This region covers the query initiator and
at least K−1 other users. We proposed methods that construct
appropriate anonymizing regions and investigated their tradeoffs.
We also designed algorithms that run at untrustworthy LBSs, and
compute exact answers to anonymized range and nearest neighbor
queries. Our work is the ﬁrst to provide a formal guarantee for the
anonymization strength. Moreover, the experimental evaluation
showed that our methods outperform the existing state-of-the-art.
Our initial ﬁndings reveal interesting directions for future
research. A challenging problem is to ensure anonymity for users
issuing continuous spatial queries. Intuitively, preserving anony-
mity is more difﬁcult in this case: asking the same query from
successive locations may disclose the identity of the querying
user, who will be included in all ASRs. Our framework can be
extended for processing continuous queries as follows: a snapshot
technique (e.g., NNC, HC) is ﬁrst employed to determine the set
AS of users included in the ASR for the initial snapshot of the
query; this anonymizing set is “frozen” for the rest of the query
lifetime. The MBR of AS is then used as ASR at subsequent
snapshots. However, as users move in different directions, such
an approach may yield large ASRs. Another possibility would
be to employ an entirely different framework based on Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) [9]. Existing PIR methods, however,
are impractical due to huge network cost. Continuous queries
involve several complex issues, and constitute a promising topic
for further work.
Another interesting aspect is preventing “background knowl-
edge” attacks, when the attacker has additional information about
the preferences of certain users. For instance, if Bob, a rugby fan,
asks for the location of the closest rugby club, and the associated
ASR contains only female users in addition to Bob, the attacker
may infer Bob as query source with higher probability. A solution
to this problem would be to group users into partitions according
to their areas of interest (e.g., users who query frequently about
restaurants, or night clubs, etc). Then, when a query is issued, the
corresponding ASR is generated with users from the same interest
group as the query source, such that each user in the ASR has an
equally likely probability of having asked the query.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate methods that do
not require an anonymizer. Assuming that the users trust each
other, the query initiators could collaborate with peers in their
vicinity to compute their anonymizing region.
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